India's Sanction Defiance: Russian Oil Imports Bolster Strategic Autonomy

India’s foreign policy has historically been rooted in non-alignment and strategic autonomy. In recent years, however, especially under the Modi government, this posture has evolved into a more transactional and interest-based approach. A clear reflection of this change is visible in India’s latest response to global pressures surrounding Russian crude oil imports. With the United States, under President Donald Trump, issuing fresh threats of imposing secondary sanctions on countries continuing to import oil from Russia—including India—the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) finally broke its long-maintained diplomatic silence. 

In a statement that was both assertive and calculated, the MEA emphasized that India’s energy needs would be fulfilled on the basis of the “best offer” and cautioned the West, particularly NATO nations, against adopting double standards.

India has emerged as one of the largest importers of Russian crude oil in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Since Western sanctions, including the G7 oil price cap of $60 per barrel, took effect, India began buying discounted Russian crude in bulk. At present, India imports approximately 2.08 million barrels of crude oil per day from Russia—amounting to nearly 42% of its total crude oil imports. This significant shift in sourcing has not only provided economic advantages to India by lowering its import bill but has also allowed the country’s refining industry to thrive, with a considerable portion of the refined output being exported to Western countries, including those within the G7.

This complex loop of buying Russian crude, refining it in Indian refineries, and then exporting the finished petroleum products to G7 markets exposes the inherent contradictions in the West’s sanction regime. The US’s proposed “secondary sanctions” target this very mechanism, which they perceive as a workaround to the sanctions on Russia. Under President Trump’s latest warning, Indian exports of refined petroleum products derived from Russian oil could face tariffs as high as 100%, effectively pricing them out of international markets. The NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s reinforcement of this warning has added pressure, but it also opened the door for India to point out the West’s selective enforcement of its sanctions policies.

India’s measured but firm response underscores a few critical factors. First, it reiterates India's stance that its foreign policy and economic decisions will be guided by national interests, especially in a domain as vital as energy security. For a growing economy like India’s, where over 85% of crude oil demand is met through imports, ensuring affordable and stable energy supplies is non-negotiable. Russian oil, especially when offered at a discount, presents an economically viable solution. With Brent crude hovering above $80 a barrel, Russian crude priced under $60 offers considerable fiscal relief. This pricing advantage supports India's current account balance and helps manage inflationary pressures domestically.

Second, the economic implications of potential US-led secondary sanctions are immense. If refined products from Indian refineries—particularly those processed from Russian crude—are slapped with high tariffs, Indian petroleum exports could become uncompetitive. This would significantly impact major Indian refining companies such as Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, and Reliance Industries, which collectively account for more than half of India’s refined exports. These companies rely heavily on their ability to buy cheap crude, refine it cost-effectively, and sell the end-products in the global market. Any disruption in this chain would hurt profits, impact employment, reduce tax contributions, and strain government revenue streams.

Additionally, such sanctions could also disrupt India’s balance of trade. Petroleum products are a key component of India's export basket, and any reduction in their competitiveness would exacerbate trade deficits. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, petroleum products accounted for approximately 15% of India’s total exports in 2023–24. A sudden drop in this share due to sanctions could have cascading effects on India’s overall trade and economic stability.

Beyond economics, the geopolitical challenge is perhaps even more complex. India is walking a tightrope, balancing its growing strategic partnership with the US and the West on one side and its long-standing defense and energy ties with Russia on the other. The United States remains a crucial trade partner, an important source of technology, investment, and defense collaboration.

Simultaneously, Russia continues to be a key defense supplier and, now, a pivotal energy partner. With the US presidential elections looming and Donald Trump known for his transactional diplomacy and unpredictable decisions, India must tread cautiously. Analysts believe that India's silence on Trump’s name in its recent response was intentional—a signal that New Delhi wishes to keep channels open for negotiation, possibly even for a broader trade deal.

The domestic political context also plays a role. As India gears up for another general election in 2026, energy inflation is a key concern for the Modi government. Affordable oil helps control petrol and diesel prices, which in turn have a direct bearing on inflation and public sentiment. Any move that disrupts cheap oil supplies or triggers higher prices at the pump could prove politically costly. Thus, energy pragmatism isn’t just an economic choice—it’s a political imperative.

India’s claim about Western double standards is not without merit. While the US and NATO have pushed for a complete economic boycott of Russia, several European countries continue to import Russian gas and other energy products under various pretexts and transition timelines. The European Union, for instance, has made provisions to continue importing Russian gas until at least 2027. This contradiction exposes the inconsistencies in the West’s sanction regimes and gives India diplomatic leverage to push back against perceived hypocrisy.

At the heart of this issue lies a deeper question: can economic coercion through secondary sanctions achieve foreign policy goals without undermining the sovereignty and economic interests of neutral countries? India, by refusing to toe the line blindly, is asserting its sovereignty and its right to engage with partners based on national interest. But this stance will also invite future tests—both diplomatic and economic.

In the medium to long term, India may need to diversify its crude sourcing options further and accelerate investments in renewable energy and domestic oil exploration to reduce dependency on volatile global supply chains. Moreover, greater emphasis on energy diplomacy with countries in West Asia, Latin America, and Africa may be necessary to hedge against future geopolitical shocks.

In conclusion, India’s response to the US threat of secondary sanctions on Russian oil signals a mature, interest-based, and sovereign approach to foreign policy. While New Delhi has so far skillfully managed its balancing act between global powers, the stakes are rising. The economic risks of secondary sanctions are real and could affect trade, domestic fuel prices, and strategic autonomy. However, India’s refusal to capitulate and its call for consistency in global sanction enforcement reflect a confident and assertive foreign policy that places national interest above geopolitical pressure. As the countdown to Trump's proposed 50-day ultimatum continues, India’s next moves—diplomatic or economic—will be closely watched not only in Washington and Moscow but across the global energy market.