Nationalism, Nationality, and the Politics of Memory: RSS’s Rewriting of India’s Nationhood

Leaders often deploy language as a tool to herd people into conformity, shaping collective identity through selective memory and rhetorical framing. Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), recently argued that India’s nationhood cannot be compared with Western models, claiming that Western political thought emerged from conflict-heavy environments. He insisted that India’s civilisational identity was misunderstood by outsiders and wrongly labelled as “nationalism.” According to him, the RSS prefers the term “nationality,” distancing itself from the Western concept of nationhood that, in his words, led to destructive pride and two world wars.

This assertion, however, is deeply problematic. Bhagwat’s narrative conveniently sidesteps the fact that in contemporary India, the terms Desh and Deshdrohi have become the most abused words in political discourse, weaponized to silence dissent and delegitimize opposition. The irony is stark: while he warns against excessive pride in the nation, the RSS and its political affiliates have normalized a culture where questioning government policy is equated with betrayal of the nation. This is not a civilisational identity rooted in openness but a narrowing of thought into rigid binaries.

Historically, the RSS has had a fraught relationship with Mahatma Gandhi. Nathuram Godse, Gandhi’s assassin, was once associated with the RSS, and though the organization officially distanced itself from the act, its ideological environment cannot be entirely absolved. Leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel repeatedly warned of the dangers posed by communal organizations. Patel, in a letter dated February 1948, wrote that the RSS’s activities had created an atmosphere that contributed to Gandhi’s assassination, even as he acknowledged its later attempts to reform. This historical record undermines Bhagwat’s claim of a benign, civilisational “rashtra” untouched by divisive politics.

Bhagwat’s dismissal of Gandhi’s observation in Hind Swaraj—that India lacked unity before British rule—further reveals the RSS’s selective engagement with history. Gandhi’s statement was not a colonial narrative blindly adopted but a critique of India’s fragmented polity, intended to inspire unity through moral and spiritual awakening. By branding Gandhi’s view as “wrong” and shaped by colonial teaching, Bhagwat not only diminishes Gandhi’s intellectual legacy but also attempts to rewrite history to suit the RSS’s ideological project. This rewriting is consistent with the organization’s long-standing discomfort with Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence and inclusivity, which stands in sharp contrast to the RSS’s majoritarian vision.

The RSS’s preference for “nationality” over “nationalism” is also revealing. On the surface, it appears to be a semantic distinction meant to avoid the negative connotations of nationalism in the West. Yet in practice, the RSS’s version of “nationality” has often meant cultural homogeneity, privileging one religious identity over others. Leaders like B.R. Ambedkar warned against such homogenization, arguing that true nationhood in India must embrace diversity rather than suppress it. Ambedkar’s caution resonates today, as the RSS’s rhetoric of nationality risks erasing pluralism under the guise of civilisational unity.

Moreover, Bhagwat’s claim that India’s rashtra is eternal and organic ignores the historical reality of India’s political evolution. The idea of India as a modern nation-state was shaped through anti-colonial struggle, constitutional debates, and democratic aspirations. Leaders like Nehru envisioned India as a secular republic precisely to prevent the kind of exclusionary politics that the RSS now advances. To deny this trajectory is to deny the sacrifices of countless freedom fighters who sought to build a nation based on equality and justice, not cultural supremacy.

The contradiction between Bhagwat’s rhetoric and the RSS’s practice is evident. While he speaks of harmony and civilisational identity, the organization has systematically worked to malign Gandhi, the Father of the Nation, portraying him as naïve or misguided. This campaign is not accidental but strategic, designed to push people away from rationality and critical thinking, replacing it with a herd mentality that equates loyalty to the ruling ideology with patriotism. As Apoorvanand has noted, the RSS often speaks of peace and harmony to the outside world while feeding its cadres a daily diet of hate. This duplicity underscores the danger of accepting Bhagwat’s words at face value.

In conclusion, Bhagwat’s remarks on nationalism and nationality are less about philosophical clarity and more about ideological positioning. By rejecting Gandhi’s insights, downplaying the RSS’s historical complicity in divisive politics, and redefining nationhood in cultural terms, he seeks to reshape India’s collective memory. Yet history reminds us that excessive pride, exclusionary identity, and herd-like conformity have always been tools of authoritarian leaders. India’s true civilisational strength lies not in uniformity but in its ability to embrace diversity, dissent, and dialogue. To forget this lesson is to risk repeating the very tragedies Bhagwat claims to warn against.