Supreme Court Verdict on Governors’ Assent: Elasticity or Erosion of Federalism?

Supreme Court Verdict on Governor: New Delhi —The Supreme Court’s ruling that neither the President nor Governors can be bound by timelines in granting assent to Bills has opened a new chapter in India’s federal debate. While the Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai emphasized that “fixing timelines for Governors is against the elasticity provided by the Constitution,” the court verdict raises a calculative question: does elasticity strengthen cooperative federalism, or does it provide a loophole for political obstruction? 

The court’s reasoning rests on the principle of separation of powers. Imposing deadlines, it argued, would amount to judicial encroachment upon executive authority. Yet, the same bench clarified that Governors cannot indefinitely withhold assent. This duality—no timelines, but no indefinite delay—creates a paradox. How do we measure “indefinite”? If a Bill remains pending for six months, is that obstruction? If for a year, is that constitutional elasticity or political misuse?  

SC clarifies Governor’s powers

Data from recent years suggests a pattern of gubernatorial delays disproportionately affecting opposition-ruled states. In Tamil Nadu, ten Bills were held back by the Governor until the Supreme Court intervened in April 2024, granting deemed assent under Article 142. In Kerala, West Bengal, and Punjab, similar delays have been reported. The Union government, however, argued that the judiciary cannot substitute itself for constitutional authorities. Today’s verdict vindicates that position, but at what cost?  

The bench outlined three options available to Governors under Article 200: grant assent, return the Bill for reconsideration, or refer it to the President. But what happens when none of these options is exercised for months? The ruling says courts cannot compel action, yet insists Governors must not adopt obstructionist approaches. This raises a calculative dilemma: without timelines, what mechanism ensures accountability?  

Opposition Parties Accusing Central Government of using Governors

Federalism in India is cooperative by design, but political practice often turns it competitive. Governors, appointed by the Centre, have increasingly been accused of acting as political agents rather than neutral constitutional heads. The Modi government has been accused by opposition parties of using Governors to restrain state governments. The Supreme Court’s verdict, hailed by the Centre as a victory, risks reinforcing this imbalance. If Governors can delay without judicial oversight, does this not tilt federalism towards central dominance?  

Consider the economic impact. Delayed assent to Bills can stall state-level reforms in education, health, and industry. Tamil Nadu’s Bills on university appointments, for instance, were delayed for months, affecting governance. If elasticity allows such delays, is it not strangulating state autonomy? The court insists dialogue is the solution, but dialogue requires willingness. What if Governors refuse dialogue?  

The judgment also rejected the concept of “deemed assent,” calling it unconstitutional. Yet, deemed assent was precisely the mechanism that allowed Tamil Nadu’s Bills to move forward. By striking it down, the court has removed a tool of judicial correction. The question then becomes: what corrective mechanism remains if Governors misuse their discretion?  

Analytically, the supreme court verdict reflects a tension between constitutional theory and political reality. In theory, elasticity preserves the dignity of constitutional offices. In reality, elasticity without accountability risks becoming a weapon of obstruction. The court’s refusal to impose timelines is defensible in principle, but indefensible in practice if delays continue unchecked.  

The calculative challenge is clear:  

- If Governors delay assent for 3 months, is it acceptable?  

- If for 6 months, does it weaken governance?  

- If for 12 months, does it erode federalism?  

Without judicially enforceable timelines, these questions remain unanswered. The verdict leaves accountability to political morality, but Indian politics has rarely been guided by morality alone.  

Ultimately, the ruling is a victory for constitutional elasticity but a setback for state autonomy. It strengthens the Centre’s hand while leaving states vulnerable to gubernatorial obstruction. The Supreme Court has chosen principle over pragmatism, but the cost may be borne by federal balance.

The larger question remains: in a democracy where legislatures represent the people, should unelected Governors have the power to stall their will indefinitely?