Vijay’s Political Test: Can Popularity Become Organisation in Tamil Nadu?

Whether good or bad, actor Vijay, who is also the president of Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK), has been pushed into a position where he may have to contest the election almost independently.

Except for K. A. Sengottaiyan, who left the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and joined him, there are very few established political faces in the party. Even those whom he had said would come or are coming have not joined so far. In other alliances and parties, after seat-sharing is finalised, there remains a limited possibility that those denied opportunities or rejected may come and join.

Congress leaders, who had been raising their voice seeking a larger share from the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam by creating the impression of forming an alliance with TVK — seeking more seats to contest in the election and a share in power — have now begun to tone down. The Congress is most likely to remain in alliance with the DMK; a shift does not appear probable at this stage.

With most parties having already aligned themselves, only a few such as Premalatha Vijayakanth’s Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam, S. Ramadoss’s Pattali Makkal Katchi, and K. Krishnasamy’s Puthiya Tamilagam remain. It is still not confirmed with whom they will align.

Arunraj, TVK’s policy propaganda secretary, has stated that the party will secure 30 per cent of the vote share and that it has the capacity to form a government independently in Tamil Nadu. General Secretary Bussy Anand asserts that Vijay becoming Chief Minister is certain.

Positive thought — good confidence.

However, the core question persists: when will Vijay shed the image of an actor and the accompanying hero mindset, and transition fully into the role of a political leader? That remains unclear.

Vijay launched Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam on February 2, 2024. Since the party’s inception, how many times has he directly engaged with the public? It is difficult even to quantify the number of public appearances.

February 2, 2024 — Party launch; June 28 — Felicitation for high-scoring Class 10 and 12 students; August 22 — Introduction of party flag and song; November 30 — Ambedkar book release; December 4 — Relief distribution for those affected by Cyclone Fengal; January 29, 2025 — District secretaries’ meeting; February 2 — Second anniversary; February 26 — Cut-out agitation against DMK and BJP; May 30, June 4, 15 — Student felicitation at Mamallapuram; October 27 — Visit to affected families in Karur; February 2, 2026 — Third anniversary celebration. In total, approximately 13–14 events.

Most of these were conducted either at the party office or within controlled indoor venues, with limited audiences.

Large public gatherings were comparatively fewer: October 27, 2024 — First state conference at Vikravandi; January 20, 2025 — Visit opposing the Parandur airport project; April 26–27 — Roadshow and booth committee meeting in Coimbatore; May 21 — Caravan rally in Madurai before departing for Kodaikanal for the shooting of “Jananayagan”; July 13 — Protest in Chennai condemning the killing of Ajith Kumar; August 21 — State conference in Madurai; September 13 — Roadshow in Tiruchy; September 20 — Roadshows in Nagai and Tiruvarur; September 27 — Roadshows in Namakkal and Karur; after the Karur incident in which 41 lives were lost, there was a significant gap; November 23 — Meeting at Sunguvarchatram in Kanchipuram; December 11 — Puducherry; December 18 — Erode. Approximately 12 major field events.

Additionally, on April 19, 2024, he cast his vote in the Lok Sabha election; on September 18, he paid respects at the Periyar memorial; and on July 2, 2025, he briefly visited Tiruppuvanam to console the family of Ajith Kumar, who was allegedly beaten to death by police.

In cinematic terms, assuming an eight-hour call sheet, since launching the party Vijay has allocated roughly 25–30 call sheets’ worth of time to political activity.

Even during certain protests, after arrangements were made, his presence resembled a cameo or guest appearance rather than sustained field engagement. Direct immersion among the public, as one among them, appears limited.

Two years after the party’s formation, much of the organisation still appears rooted in a fan-based mindset centred around the actor. Has Vijay attempted to dismantle this image-driven structure, transform fans into disciplined cadre, and reposition himself from screen hero to political leader? There is little in the party’s operational structure to indicate such a transition.

Security arrangements remain extensive — barricades, controlled access, and visible layers of protection. The optics resemble those of a film star appearance rather than a conventional political outreach programme.

A practical question arises: if Vijay were elected as an MLA but not as Chief Minister, would accessibility improve? Would constituents be able to submit petitions, seek recommendations, or directly engage on civic grievances?

The persistence of image-centric politics has historically proven incompatible with long-term political consolidation in India.

The tragic Karur incident, in which 41 people lost their lives, should have served as a moment of institutional reflection for the party. Yet, mobilisation patterns appear largely unchanged. Observers note apprehension among local residents in Panaiyur during recent gatherings at the party office.

The Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly comprises 234 constituencies. Each constituency contains approximately 250–350 polling booths, depending on population, amounting to over 88,000 booths statewide. Effective booth-level management demands structured cadre, trained agents, and coordinated logistics. Without a robust organisational framework or alliance support, the operational challenge remains formidable.

Comparisons with the late Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran and the early phase of AIADMK are analytically unsound. Political contexts differ, and organisational depth cannot be replicated merely through symbolic parallels. This structural challenge extends beyond TVK; even national parties face booth-level constraints in Tamil Nadu.

Separately, the Income Tax Department has stated that ₹15 crore received for the film “Puli” was not reflected in declared accounts within the stipulated time. The court proceedings addressed the question of penalty for delayed disclosure, not the existence of income itself. Following the court’s decision upholding the penalty, rival parties have questioned Vijay’s anti-corruption rhetoric. A claim that ₹2 crore was spent for the fan club was reportedly dismissed by the court due to lack of evidence.

Last year, Vijay commented on the Union Budget. This year, there has been no response thus far. Given his political position, the silence invites scrutiny.

At the party’s third anniversary event, he sharply criticised the DMK as a political adversary but did not significantly target the Bharatiya Janata Party or the Union Government as ideological opponents. Political observers may interpret this selectively; definitive conclusions would be premature.

If the initial phase of the Assembly election resembles a competitive performance arena, Vijay’s public mobilisation in Panaiyur may appear energetic. However, electoral politics extends far beyond symbolic optics.

Vijay has publicly declared his commitment to Tamil Nadu’s future. Yet, the evolving political landscape presents immediate strategic questions. If no alliance materialises, can a largely fan-driven structure transition into a disciplined electoral machine?

One fact remains evident: Vijay commands visible public support. Whether that support translates into structured votes, how it disperses across constituencies, who benefits, and who is adversely affected — these questions will be answered only when ballots are counted.

In electoral politics, optics may create momentum. Outcomes, however, are determined by organisation, arithmetic, and sustained ground engagement.