China and Pakistan’s Strategic Push to Replace SAARC: A New Bloc to Counter India’s Regional Influence?

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), once hailed as the most ambitious regional initiative for fostering cooperation among South Asian nations, has effectively been dormant since 2014. With India and Pakistan locked in an enduring diplomatic and strategic standoff, the forum’s credibility and utility have waned. In this vacuum, China and Pakistan have reportedly taken concrete steps to craft an alternative regional bloc—one that not only revives economic collaboration in South Asia but also sidelines New Delhi’s central role in regional diplomacy.

According to diplomatic sources, China and Pakistan are advancing a plan to form a new multilateral organisation that would potentially replace SAARC. While details of the proposed organisation remain under wraps, trilateral meetings involving China, Pakistan, and countries like Afghanistan and Bangladesh have already taken place. Similar meetings are being planned with Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, signaling a determined effort to reshape South Asia’s regional architecture.

At the heart of this move lies a shared strategic vision by Beijing and Islamabad: counterbalancing India's growing geopolitical influence and thwarting New Delhi’s efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan over terrorism-related concerns.

SAARC: A Casualty of India-Pakistan Hostility

SAARC was created in 1985 with the aim of promoting peace, economic growth, and regional cooperation among its eight member states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Despite high expectations, the forum has remained largely symbolic, crippled by the chronic hostilities between India and Pakistan.

The last SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu in 2014. The 2016 summit scheduled to be hosted in Islamabad was cancelled after India pulled out in the aftermath of the deadly Uri terrorist attack, which it blamed on Pakistan-based militants. Several other countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, followed India’s lead, further deepening SAARC's paralysis.

China’s Strategic Entry into South Asia

Beijing’s increasing engagement in South Asia is part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), under which it has invested heavily in infrastructure, ports, and road networks across the region. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a flagship BRI project—is one of the most ambitious of these, stretching from China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.

However, India has vehemently opposed CPEC, as the corridor runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, a region India claims as its own. India has also stayed away from the BRI altogether, citing concerns over sovereignty, debt traps, and opaque project governance.

The recent decision to expand CPEC into Afghanistan—agreed upon during a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting in Beijing—is emblematic of China and Pakistan’s intention to deepen their strategic footprint in South Asia. The inclusion of Kabul, especially at a time when relations between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad have been fraught, indicates a larger strategic calculus that supersedes bilateral irritants.

A New Bloc in the Making?

China and Pakistan are not merely engaging bilaterally or trilaterally—they are laying the groundwork for a broader multilateral platform. The goal appears to be twofold:

1. Dilute India’s influence in regional diplomacy by creating an alternative bloc that does not depend on India’s participation.

2. Revive regional connectivity and trade through a framework centered around Chinese investment and Pakistani logistical access.

The recent trilateral meeting involving China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in Kunming adds weight to these ambitions. Bangladesh has historically maintained strong ties with India but has also courted Chinese investment in recent years. If Dhaka were to join such a bloc, it would signal a significant geopolitical shift.

Similar overtures are reportedly being made to Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. While these countries have their own economic and political calculations, their participation in a new regional platform would mark a tectonic shift in South Asian geopolitics.

Diplomatic sources indicate that India may be formally invited to join the new grouping. This invitation, however, appears more symbolic than genuine. Given New Delhi’s firm opposition to the BRI and its repeated calls for transparency and mutual respect in regional cooperation, it is unlikely India would accept a seat at a China-led table that includes Pakistan as a founding member.

A Platform of Opportunity or a Strategic Trap?

The new organisation being conceived by Beijing and Islamabad purports to enhance economic cooperation, promote connectivity, and increase regional engagement. These are goals similar to those laid out by SAARC but never fully realised. If structured transparently and with equal representation, the new bloc could, in theory, help smaller South Asian nations bypass the India-Pakistan rivalry and secure much-needed development aid and investment.

However, critics argue that the new initiative could be a thinly veiled extension of China’s BRI, cloaked in multilateralism but ultimately serving Beijing’s strategic and economic interests. Countries enticed by short-term gains could find themselves entrapped in long-term dependencies, similar to the “debt diplomacy” warnings often associated with Chinese infrastructure investments.

For Pakistan, the stakes are equally high. Isolated diplomatically and grappling with internal economic crises, Islamabad is keen to present itself as a regional bridge rather than a security concern. Aligning with China and pushing a new regional narrative allows Pakistan to reclaim some diplomatic ground.

 A Regional Cold War?

If the proposal for a new regional grouping materialises, South Asia could witness the beginning of a regional cold war—two competing blocs with differing visions for the future. One, led by India, grounded in democratic multilateralism, and the other, steered by China and Pakistan, focused on strategic alignment and economic interdependence.

Whether this new initiative flourishes or fizzles will depend largely on how countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka respond. Their choices will shape not only the region’s economic future but also its strategic orientation for decades to come.

As SAARC fades into irrelevance, the emerging bloc may not just replace it—it could redefine South Asia itself.