West Asia on Fire: Will the US–Israel Strike on Iran Trigger a Strategic Earthquake for India?

An unprovoked military strike by the United States and Israel on Iran has not merely escalated tensions in West Asia; it has potentially placed India’s economic, diplomatic and strategic interests in jeopardy. With more than nine million Indians working across the Gulf and remittances exceeding $125 billion annually—of which nearly half comes from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—New Delhi faces a multidimensional crisis that extends beyond immediate airspace disruptions.

Indian airlines’ suspension of flights to destinations such as Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv is only the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. Aviation analysts note that nearly 20 percent of India’s international air traffic passes through or over West Asian airspace. Prolonged closures could significantly increase operational costs, disrupt supply chains and inflate ticket prices. But aviation is not the real concern. The real fault line lies in energy security and geopolitical balance.

India imports nearly 85 percent of its crude oil requirements, and West Asia supplies over 60 percent of that demand. Any sustained conflict involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz or the broader Gulf region would send oil prices soaring. Defence and strategic affairs analyst Brahma Chellaney has often warned that “India’s economic rise is inseparable from energy stability in the Gulf.” If Brent crude were to surge beyond $120 per barrel, India’s current account deficit could widen sharply, putting pressure on the rupee and fuelling domestic inflation. The Reserve Bank of India would then face the unenviable task of balancing currency stability with growth.

Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran has repeatedly emphasised that India’s West Asia policy is rooted in “strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.” India maintains robust ties with Israel in defence technology and intelligence cooperation while simultaneously engaging Iran for connectivity projects like the Chabahar Port, which provides strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. An American-backed regime change attempt in Tehran, especially under President Donald Trump, could destabilise this delicate balancing act. If Iran descends into prolonged instability, India’s investments in Chabahar—already slow due to sanctions complexities—may become untenable.

Retired Lieutenant General Syed Ata Hasnain, a respected military voice, has argued that “modern conflicts in West Asia rarely remain geographically confined.” Proxy warfare, cyber disruptions and maritime sabotage could spill into the Arabian Sea, directly affecting Indian shipping lanes. Nearly 30 percent of global seaborne oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz. Any blockade or retaliatory action by Iran would disrupt not only global markets but India’s strategic petroleum reserves planning. Defence analysts at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) point out that India’s emergency reserves currently cover just over nine days of net imports—far from sufficient in a prolonged crisis.

The human dimension is equally critical. The Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Israel and Iran constitutes the backbone of remittance inflows. In 2023–24, remittances from the UAE alone were estimated at over $20 billion. Former Army Chief General M.M. Naravane has highlighted in public forums that evacuation operations—like Operation Rahat in Yemen (2015) or the Ukraine evacuation in 2022—are logistically and diplomatically complex. “In a full-scale regional war scenario, evacuation may not be as smooth as previous missions,” he cautioned in a strategic seminar last year. With multiple airspaces closed and naval routes potentially contested, India’s options could be severely constrained.

There is also the question of domestic political discourse. While Israel is viewed by many in India as a trusted defence partner—bilateral trade exceeding $10 billion and defence cooperation deepening over two decades—India cannot afford to be perceived as taking sides in a sectarian or geopolitical confrontation. Former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid once observed that “India’s credibility in West Asia stems from its ability to speak to all sides without ideological baggage.” A perception shift could complicate labour agreements and investment flows from Gulf monarchies.

Strategically, Washington’s calculation appears to rest on swift coercive diplomacy or regime destabilisation. However, history—from Iraq in 2003 to Libya in 2011—suggests that regime change strategies often unleash prolonged instability rather than orderly transitions. Military historian Lawrence Freedman has written that “wars are rarely linear in outcome; they evolve unpredictably.” If Iran retaliates asymmetrically through regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria or Yemen, the conflict could widen, drawing in non-state actors and creating a theatre of protracted instability.

From India’s defence preparedness perspective, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region would require enhanced vigilance. The Indian Navy has steadily expanded its footprint, but sustained deployment in high-tension waters would strain operational logistics. Analysts at the National Maritime Foundation suggest that any Hormuz disruption could compel India to increase escort missions for commercial vessels, raising defence expenditure in the short term.

The geopolitical implications are equally complex. China, heavily dependent on Gulf energy, may leverage the crisis to deepen its strategic engagement in the region, positioning itself as a mediator or alternative power broker. Russia, already under Western sanctions, may find in Iran an even closer strategic alignment. India’s foreign policy establishment would therefore need to navigate not only the immediate crisis but also the broader realignment of global power structures.

The central debate, therefore, is not whether India will be affected—it undoubtedly will be—but how prepared it is to manage cascading consequences. Should New Delhi recalibrate its energy diversification strategy more aggressively toward renewables and alternative suppliers? Should it accelerate strategic petroleum reserve expansion? Or should it deepen diplomatic engagement to play a mediatory role, leveraging its credibility with both Washington and Tehran?

Experts underline that the US gamble could prove riskier than anticipated. If the conflict extends beyond a short punitive operation into a drawn-out confrontation, India’s economic recovery, inflation trajectory and diaspora security could face sustained headwinds. The government’s immediate priority will be crisis management—ensuring safe evacuation channels, stabilising energy supplies and maintaining diplomatic neutrality.

Yet the larger question lingers: can India remain insulated from a geopolitical earthquake in West Asia, or will this conflict compel a strategic rethinking of its foreign policy doctrine? As flames rise in one of the world’s most volatile regions, New Delhi must confront an uncomfortable truth—its economic growth story is deeply intertwined with the stability of a region now on the brink.