A Constitutional Threshold: President’s Letter to the Supreme Court Marks a Defining Moment in Indian Federalism

The President of India’s recent correspondence with the Supreme Court, expressing concern over its judgment in the case regarding governors’ assent to state bills, is a watershed moment in the evolution of Indian federalism. In doing so, the President has not only exercised her moral authority as the constitutional head of the republic but also underscored a deepening institutional unease about the shifting balance of power between the Union and the States.

The judgment in question – delivered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court – ruled that governors cannot “sit on” bills passed by state legislatures indefinitely. It reaffirmed that the office of the governor is not above legislative scrutiny and that delays in giving assent, returning, or reserving bills for the President violate the federal structure envisioned by the Constitution. This decision was hailed by constitutional experts, state governments, and democratic institutions as a much-needed corrective to a growing trend of partisan obstruction by governors in opposition-ruled states.

However, the President’s letter—addressed to the Chief Justice of India and disclosed in part through press reports—expresses reservations about the implications of the judgment on the constitutional role of the governor. Her letter reportedly urges a reconsideration of the judgment’s interpretation, particularly with regard to the discretionary powers of governors and the process of reserving bills for presidential consideration.

The Role of the President: More Than Ceremonial

Traditionally, the office of the President of India has been seen as above the hurly-burly of daily politics. Presidents rarely intervene directly in matters of judicial interpretation. That is precisely why this intervention carries enormous weight. It signals that the President, in her capacity as the guardian of the Constitution, perceives a potential misalignment between the judiciary’s interpretation and the foundational principles of the Constitution she has sworn to uphold.

To be sure, the President is not challenging the authority of the Supreme Court or encroaching upon the domain of judicial review. Rather, she is exercising a right to seek clarity and suggest institutional reflection. In that, her action is both unprecedented and constitutionally valid.

There is a long-standing debate in Indian constitutional jurisprudence over the nature of the governor’s powers—whether they are bound by the advice of the council of ministers of the state, or whether they possess a discretionary leeway beyond what the Constitution explicitly provides. The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, reaffirmed that the governor is a constitutional head, not a parallel political actor. Yet, over the last decade, instances of governors holding back assent to bills, delaying legislative action, or acting in concert with the Union government have raised alarm about a systemic erosion of state autonomy.

The Federal Balance at Risk

The current debate is not about legal technicalities—it is about the future of federalism in India. Our Constitution envisions a Union of States, not a unitary state with central command. While it is true that India’s federalism is “quasi-federal” with strong central features, it is equally true that the survival of democratic governance rests on mutual respect between the Centre and the States.

The misuse of the office of the governor—often appointed from ruling party circles and acting as an extended arm of the Centre—has become an acute flashpoint. State governments, especially those run by opposition parties, have consistently accused governors of sitting indefinitely on legislation, interfering in university appointments, and bypassing elected governments. The recent examples from Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Delhi, and West Bengal offer a disturbing picture of what happens when constitutional functionaries assume partisan roles.

The Supreme Court’s judgment was a necessary attempt to arrest this slide. It asserted that governors are constitutionally obligated to act within a “reasonable time” and cannot override the mandate of democratically elected governments. That assertion restored a semblance of balance and injected much-needed accountability into the role of the governor.

A Democratic Conversation, Not a Confrontation

The President’s letter must therefore not be viewed as a confrontation between the Executive and Judiciary, but as part of an evolving democratic conversation. It opens up the space for deeper reflection on the constitutional roles of high offices. What is at stake is not merely the interpretation of Article 200 or 201 of the Constitution, but the very spirit of cooperative federalism.

One must remember that the Constitution is not a static document. It lives and evolves through interpretation, practice, and debate. Presidents in the past—like R. Venkataraman and K.R. Narayanan—have subtly influenced national direction through timely interventions, not through executive orders, but through letters, speeches, and reminders of constitutional morality. In the same vein, President Droupadi Murmu’s letter is a reminder to all institutions to reflect on their actions and assumptions.

Importantly, her letter also draws attention to the often-overlooked complexity of the process of reserving bills for presidential assent. This process—though framed as a safeguard—has increasingly been used to delay, derail, or deny legislative intent in opposition-ruled states. By bringing this aspect to light, the President has indirectly questioned whether the Centre is acting in good faith when bills are reserved indefinitely without communication or clarity.

Moving Forward: Institutional Recalibration

What is now required is not institutional confrontation but institutional recalibration. The Supreme Court must consider whether a clarificatory hearing or review is necessary—not to appease the President, but to ensure that its interpretation strengthens, not weakens, the balance of power.

Parliament, too, must reflect on the role and appointment process of governors. The Sarkaria Commission and the Punchhi Commission had recommended transparent, merit-based, and non-political appointments. These recommendations must be revisited and implemented. States must have a greater say in the selection of governors, and there must be statutory timeframes within which governors must act on bills.

Finally, the Centre must recognise that federalism is not a concession—it is a constitutional obligation. Weaponising gubernatorial offices against state governments weakens the republic as a whole. The judiciary’s role is to uphold this balance, not merely to resolve disputes.

A Republic of Dignity, Not Delay

In the end, the President’s letter is a call to all constitutional actors to restore dignity to their offices and harmony to their interactions. It is a reminder that the success of Indian democracy lies not in unilateral dominance, but in the humility of institutions to correct course when required. The Supreme Court has taken a bold step in defending state legislatures from arbitrary gubernatorial delay. The President has taken a courageous step in calling for introspection. Both actions must be seen not in opposition, but as essential for the health of India’s constitutional democracy.

Let this moment not degenerate into a blame game. Let it instead spark the democratic maturity needed for the republic to endure—and thrive.