Can Governors Stall Democracy? Supreme Court Faces a Constitutional Crossroad
The Supreme Court's decision to review the President's reference under Article 143 has sparked a constitutional debate on the separation of powers and executive discretion.;

The Supreme Court’s decision to issue notice to the Centre and all states on the Presidential reference under Article 143 marks a pivotal moment in India’s constitutional discourse. This reference, initiated by President Droupadi Murmu, seeks the Court’s advisory opinion on a series of legal and procedural questions arising from its April 8, 2025 judgment, which for the first time laid down timelines for the President and Governors to act on Bills passed by state legislatures. The judgment, delivered in response to a petition filed by the Tamil Nadu government, held that Governors cannot indefinitely withhold assent to Bills—a practice colloquially known as the “pocket veto”—and must act within a constitutionally reasonable timeframe. Specifically, the Court mandated that Governors must decide on re-passed Bills within one month and, if reserved for Presidential consideration, the President must act within three months. This ruling, invoking Article 142 to “do complete justice,” has triggered a constitutional debate on the separation of powers and the justiciability of executive discretion.
Article 143 of the Constitution empowers the President to refer questions of law or fact to the Supreme Court for its advisory opinion if the matter is of public importance. While the Court’s opinion is not binding, it carries significant weight in shaping constitutional interpretation. Historically, Article 143 has been invoked sparingly—only about 15 times since independence—most notably in the Berubari Union case (1960), the Special Courts Bill reference (1978), and the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid matter (1993). In the current instance, President Murmu has posed 14 questions to the Court, many of which challenge the April 8 verdict’s implications. These include whether the Governor is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 200, whether the President’s discretion under Article 201 is subject to judicial review, and whether the Supreme Court can prescribe timelines for constitutional authorities in the absence of explicit provisions.
The reference also raises broader concerns about the judiciary’s use of Article 142. Critics, including former Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar, have likened the Court’s invocation of Article 142 to deploying a “nuclear missile,” arguing that it risks judicial overreach into executive functions. The government, represented by Attorney General R. Venkataramani and Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, has indicated that it will contest the maintainability of the reference, suggesting that the Court’s April 8 ruling may have exceeded its adjudicatory jurisdiction. States like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have also signaled their intent to challenge the reference, arguing that the issues raised have already been settled and that the reference may be an attempt to reopen a closed matter through advisory jurisdiction.
At the heart of this debate lies the tension between constitutional silence and judicial activism. The Constitution does not specify timelines for Governors or the President to act on Bills, leading to prolonged delays that undermine legislative intent and democratic accountability. The Supreme Court’s April 8 judgment sought to fill this vacuum by establishing procedural safeguards. However, the reference now questions whether such judicial prescriptions are constitutionally permissible. It also probes whether Article 361, which grants personal immunity to the President and Governors, bars judicial scrutiny of their actions under Articles 200 and 201. Furthermore, the reference asks whether courts can adjudicate the content of a Bill before it becomes law, and whether Article 142 can be used to override constitutional procedures.
The implications of the Court’s eventual opinion are far-reaching. If the Court upholds its April 8 ruling, it could set a precedent for judicial oversight of executive delays, reinforcing the principle that constitutional offices must act within reasonable timeframes. This would strengthen legislative efficacy and curb the misuse of discretionary powers. On the other hand, if the Court revises or dilutes its earlier stance, it may reaffirm the autonomy of constitutional authorities and limit judicial intervention in executive processes. Either outcome will have a lasting impact on Centre-State relations, especially in the context of increasing friction between Governors and opposition-ruled states.
The procedural aspects of the reference are also noteworthy. A five-judge Constitution Bench, led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, has been constituted to hear the matter. The Bench includes Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha, and A.S. Chandurkar—all senior judges with deep expertise in constitutional law. The hearing schedule is expected to be finalized on July 29, with arguments likely to commence in mid-August. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved, the Court’s deliberations will be closely watched by legal scholars, political analysts, and institutional stakeholders.
In sum, the Presidential reference under Article 143 is not merely a legal exercise—it is a constitutional moment. It invites the Supreme Court to clarify the contours of executive discretion, judicial review, and institutional accountability. It also tests the resilience of India’s federal structure and the balance of powers enshrined in the Constitution. Whether the Court chooses to reaffirm its April 8 verdict or recalibrate its position, the outcome will shape the future of legislative governance and the role of constitutional functionaries in India’s democratic framework.