Naga Peace, Act East Policy, and India’s Geopolitical Stakes

The visit of Thuingaleng Muivah, the veteran Naga leader, to his ancestral village of Ungma and the talk of a reconciliation between NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) has revived speculation about the future of the Naga peace process. Since the 1997 ceasefire, the Naga issue has been central to India’s Northeast security strategy. A united Naga front, if sustained, can reshape not only the political landscape of Nagaland but also the larger geopolitics of the Indo–Myanmar frontier. The question today is whether this is the beginning of a settlement—or yet another pause in a long journey of broken promises.

The Symbolism of Naga Unity

For decades, the split between NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K) weakened the Naga cause and gave Delhi room to maneuver. Their reconciliation, even at a symbolic level, changes the equation. Muivah’s ancestral homecoming carries emotional weight, signaling to Nagas that the struggle has not lost its historical memory. If the reconciliation translates into a common negotiating position, Delhi will be under pressure to respond with seriousness.

Two Possible Futures

1. If Talks Succeed:

A settlement built on the 1997 ceasefire will close the most important insurgency chapter in the Northeast.

It will isolate the valley-based Meitei insurgents, who are already weakened and fragmented. The UNLF’s peace move has set a precedent, and others may follow.

ULFA(I), long dependent on external sanctuaries, will be cornered. Paresh Baruah, isolated and aging, may finally be persuaded to return to Jerai, perhaps through his trusted lieutenant Gulap Baruah. A dignified “homecoming” could mark the end of Assam’s insurgency era.

2. If Talks Fail:

Grassroots frustration will deepen, especially among younger Nagas who have grown up under the ceasefire but seen no political resolution.

The movement may fragment into smaller armed groups engaged in extortion and smuggling, keeping the region unstable.

Meitei insurgents in Manipur could gain new space by projecting themselves as the “last line of resistance” against Delhi’s neglect.

Paresh Baruah would gain a second wind, arguing that Delhi never honors commitments, and keeping ULFA(I) alive as a lingering threat.

Most critically, a failed peace process would reopen doors for China to rebuild influence through old networks in Myanmar and Yunnan.

The Geopolitical Stakes: Tigers vs. Dragons

The Naga settlement is not only a domestic question but also a geopolitical one. China has long used Northeast insurgent groups as pressure points against India. A final peace deal deprives Beijing of a proxy lever, just as India strengthens its presence in Myanmar through diplomatic, military, and economic engagement. In this sense, the Naga issue is part of a larger contest: the Indian “tiger” seeking to hold its ground against the Chinese “dragon” in the frontier.

Act East Policy and the Northeast Corridor

India’s Act East Policy rests on the assumption that the Northeast will serve as the gateway to ASEAN. Projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway can transform the region into a hub of connectivity. But these projects are hostage to peace. A road cannot be built if insurgents dominate the hills. A corridor cannot function if local populations mistrust Delhi’s intent.

If peace succeeds, Guwahati and Imphal can become the trade arteries linking South Asia with Southeast Asia. India’s soft power—through Buddhism, cultural ties, and historical linkages—can be translated into real economic and strategic influence. But if peace fails, the Act East vision collapses into paper policy, leaving the field open for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

India’s Emerging Dominance in Southeast Asia

Beyond connectivity, India already holds strategic leverage. Its naval presence in the Andaman Sea gives it a potential chokehold over the Malacca Strait, the lifeline of East Asian trade. ASEAN states increasingly view India as a balancer to China. But for this external dominance to be credible, Delhi must first settle its internal frontier. A fractured Northeast undermines India’s Act East promise; a peaceful Northeast makes it the natural leader bridging South and Southeast Asia.

The reconciliation between NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K), and Muivah’s return to his roots, may appear symbolic. Yet they carry the weight of a 27-year peace process that hangs between resolution and relapse. The choices ahead are stark:

A settlement that closes the Naga chapter, disarms Meitei insurgency, and isolates ULFA(I), enabling India to finally project dominance into Southeast Asia.

Or a failure that reopens insurgent wounds, hands China a lever in the frontier, and reduces the Act East Policy to empty rhetoric.

The fate of India’s Northeast—and its role in Southeast Asia—thus hinges on whether Delhi, the Nagas, and other stakeholders can convert this fragile moment of unity into a durable peace.