Tibet and the Northeast: The Unequal Optics of China–India Diplomacy
While Beijing transforms Tibet into a symbol of strength during India reset talks, New Delhi's absence from crisis-hit Northeast exposes strategic weakness
The summer of 2025 has witnessed a remarkable diplomatic choreography between Asia’s two rising giants—China and India. On the one hand, New Delhi hosted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for a carefully crafted reset in bilateral ties: resumption of flights, border confidence-building, cultural exchanges, and dialogue mechanisms. On the other hand, almost simultaneously, Chinese President Xi Jinping staged a rare, highly symbolic visit to Lhasa, celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
This synchrony was not accidental. It reflected Beijing’s ability to integrate its domestic consolidation in Tibet with its external projection in South Asia. In contrast, India continues to treat its Northeast Region (NER)—its own borderland mirror of Tibet—as a fractured and fragile periphery. The failure of India’s leadership to even symbolically visit Manipur during its prolonged crisis exposes a weak spot in New Delhi’s otherwise ambitious regional diplomacy.
China’s Strategic Messaging: Xi in Lhasa
Xi Jinping’s Lhasa visit was layered with symbolism and strategic calculation. Tibet has historically been China’s most sensitive frontier—geopolitically crucial as the source of Asia’s major rivers, and ideologically significant due to the Dalai Lama’s legacy. By personally appearing in Lhasa while his foreign minister was negotiating in New Delhi, Xi sent multiple signals:
1. Domestic Control: Tibet is firmly integrated into the Chinese state, and its autonomy anniversary is not just a commemoration but a declaration of political finality.
2. Border Signaling: Tibet is the forward staging post for China’s military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. A secure Tibet means a stronger Chinese posture in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.
3. Religious Diplomacy: By presiding over celebrations in a region central to Buddhist geopolitics, Xi also reminded India, Nepal, and Bhutan that China seeks cultural legitimacy in Himalayan Buddhism.
4. Seamless Policy Fusion: China made it clear that its internal unity (Lhasa) and external outreach (Delhi) are two arms of the same strategy.
In essence, Tibet was transformed into a showpiece of Chinese strength just as Beijing sought warmer ties with India.
India’s Contrasting Optics: The Scar of Manipur
While Beijing showcased confidence, India’s Northeast—geopolitically as vital as Tibet—is burdened with a different narrative. The prolonged unrest in Manipur since 2023 has scarred both the domestic and diplomatic images of the Indian state. Unlike Xi in Lhasa, neither Prime Minister Narendra Modi nor President Droupadi Murmu has set foot in Manipur during the crisis. This absence reveals several weaknesses:
1. Political Hesitation: Delhi fears appearing partisan in an ethnically polarized conflict, but silence breeds the perception of abandonment.
2. Diplomatic Weakness: For neighbors like Myanmar, Bangladesh, and even China, this vacuum signals a fragile state presence in NER.
3. Narrative Deficit: China projects Tibet as “stability achieved.” India’s silence in Manipur projects NER as “stability denied.”
Thus, while China’s Tibet becomes a stage for power, India’s NER risks being cast as a permanent scar—politically volatile, diplomatically under-attended, and strategically under-leveraged.
The Geopolitical Chessboard: Tibet vs NER
The parallel between Tibet and NER is stark:
Geography: Both are frontier highlands that determine access to South and Southeast Asia.
Security: Tibet hosts China’s forward bases; NER hosts India’s buffer against China and gateway to ASEAN.
Identity: Both regions carry histories of contested integration—Tibet through the Dalai Lama’s exile, NER through insurgencies and ethnic fault lines.
Narrative: China asserts Tibet as a triumph; India avoids spotlighting NER for fear of embarrassment.
This asymmetry has long-term implications. If China keeps projecting Tibet as a model of integration while India’s NER remains turbulent, international perception will tilt. Delhi risks losing narrative parity, no matter its military readiness.
India’s Coping Capacity
India is not helpless. Since Galwan 2020, its military posture has hardened: troops rebalanced, Rafales inducted, border infrastructure accelerated. Diplomatically, India has played a balancing act—resetting ties with Beijing while deepening QUAD, France, and Russia linkages. Economically, though dependent on China, India is pushing for “China+1” diversification.
Yet, coping is not the same as competing. Without symbolic and political embrace of its Northeast, India cannot match China’s Tibet strategy. The military can deter incursions, but optics and narratives win legitimacy.
Conclusion: The Lessons of Asymmetry
Xi Jinping’s simultaneous Lhasa appearance and Wang Yi’s Delhi diplomacy reveal China’s maturity in merging domestic confidence with external engagement. India’s hesitation in Manipur reveals the opposite: domestic fragility undercuts external credibility.
For India to truly balance China, it must transform its NER from a scar into a showcase—through visible political presence, accelerated infrastructure, and cultural reintegration. Otherwise, while China turns Tibet into its platform of strength, India risks allowing its Northeast to remain a symbol of weakness.