Opposition's Proposal for Electoral Reforms: A Pragmatic Approach to Break Parliamentary Deadlock
The Opposition's proposal for electoral reforms offers a middle ground to break the parliamentary deadlock over Bihar's SIR controversy, but the government's response has been rigid.
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The sweltering days of August in New Delhi have acquired a peculiar constancy—the relentless deadlock in Parliament over the demand for a debate on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in Bihar. In an era when the smooth functioning of India’s most hallowed legislative institution should be a given, the bitter standoff has instead exposed not just the fragility of parliamentary consensus but the core tension between government accountability and institutional autonomy.
Amid this stasis, the Opposition has made what seems to be a statesmanlike offer: allow a discussion on “electoral reforms” as a middle ground, rather than a direct confrontation over SIR—a proposal born of constructive intent to break the logjam and restore the legislature to its primary task of debate and oversight. Their suggestion is not just pragmatic but deeply rooted in history, as Congress’ Gaurav Gogoi and Jairam Ramesh have underscored through a litany of precedents in which Parliament engaged robustly on electoral matters, from as far back as 1961 to as recently as 2019.
Yet, the government’s response has been a rigid retort citing sub-judice rules. Union Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju has insisted that the functioning of autonomous institutions, especially the Election Commission, and matters under judicial consideration are explicitly barred from discussion by the House. Emphasizing parliamentary rules, he maintains that the government wants the House to focus on legislative business and bills of national interest—an argument that has been bolstered by citations of past Speaker’s rulings on the autonomy of constitutional bodies.
But this reading, critics argue, is more obstructionist than principled. It elides the vital distinction between discussing ongoing specific administrative actions (like the SIR) and the broader canvas of electoral reforms. Parliament’s own records bear witness to an enduring history of reformist engagement: be it the amending of the Conduct of Elections Rules (1961), Manubhai Patel’s 1981 resolution for a review of election laws, the expansive debate on electoral laws in 1991, or more recent initiatives like Ghulam Nabi Azad’s 2015 Calling Attention Motion on proxy and e-postal voting for NRIs, and the 2019 Short Duration Discussion on electoral reforms—in all these, Parliament’s right and duty to deliberate on electoral processes has been both asserted and respected.
Opposition leaders have also pointed out that oversight of autonomous bodies by Parliament is hardly unprecedented—issues such as electoral bonds, voter ID-Aadhaar linkage, the appointment of Election Commissioners, and even detailed reports on the conduct of constitutional authorities like the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have been discussed in the Lok Sabha[RPA].This is not simply the indulgence of legislative privilege, but a core attribute of parliamentary democracy: the sacred space where sovereign will, executive action, and institutional independence must be harmonized through debate and scrutiny.
The government’s refusal, therefore, raises significant democratic concerns. By shutting the door to even a general debate on electoral reforms, it risks insulating executive or quasi-executive actions from necessary legislative scrutiny. This becomes particularly acute against the backdrop of the SIR in Bihar, which, according to opposition parties and civil society petitioners, involves allegations of mass disenfranchisement and could set a precedent for similar actions elsewhere. The Supreme Court is, indeed, seized of many of these issues, and propriety dictates Parliament should not preempt judicial determination on specific cases. But to claim that the entire ambit of electoral reforms—arguably among the most urgent and consequential topics for the Indian Republic—can be locked away from Parliament under the pretext of autonomy or sub-judice caveats is breathtakingly expansive.
Electoral reforms in India are neither peripheral nor technical pursuits. They go to the very heart of public trust in democracy: from criminalization of politics to campaign finance, voter roll accuracy, the influence of money and muscle power, representation of marginalized groups, technological transparency with EVMs, to questions of state funding—each is a pressing national issue Parliament’s constitutional mandate is not only to legislate but to persuade, guide, caution, and channel national discourse, especially on precisely such issues.
Moreover, electoral law and reform, while operated by the Election Commission, are fundamentally creatures of statute—created, amended, and reviewable by Parliament. All major electoral reforms in the past, from disqualification provisions to transparent financing and administrative improvements, have flowed from parliamentary debates, committee recommendations, and, ultimately, the sovereign will of the people’s representatives.
This moment, then, is not merely a procedural tussle but a test—of the resolve of our democracy to allow free and fearless debate, of the willingness to listen to competing views without reducing each difference to a zero-sum standoff. The Opposition’s overture, to shift focus from an immediate and possibly contentious administrative action to the more constructive goal of broad-based electoral reforms, deserves a more sincere response.
To refuse that olive branch is to ignore Parliament’s own living history, and the aspirations of millions who look to it for hope, fairness, and democratic renewal. India’s Parliament, in these turbulent times, must remember that democracy’s true strength lies not in muzzling debate but enabling it—especially on the critical, ever-evolving task of making our elections, and therefore our democracy, truly representative and just.